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Those of us who work on rural financial markets face the 
dual challenge of dealing with nagging problems in low-income 
countries and also helping to reconstruct financial markets in 
economies that were formerly centrally planned. The lessons 
learned the past four decades in low-income countries, in my 
opinion, provide valuable guidelines for dealing with both 
challenges. Although disagreement lingers{ there is growing 
consensus about what did and did not work. This includes 
diminished expectations about what can be accomplished through 
financial markets and a recognition that the provision of formal 
financial services in rural areas is expensive and accident 
prone. We also more clearly understand the importance of overall 
economic growth, law and order, and control of inflation in 
creating an environment conducive for financial market 
development (McKinnon 1991). Using market rates of interest and 
mobilizing deposits in rural areas are now also generally 
accepted practices. 
There has been less discussion, however, of three other 
important issues that strongly influence the development of rural 
financial markets: the incentives problems involved in principal-
agent relationships, the prudential regulation problem, and 
transaction costs. It is becoming increasingly clear that flawed 
principal-agent rules and lack of prudential regulation 
contributed to the disintegration of many rural finance programs. 
It is also apparent that excessive transaction costs are a major 
explanation for the lack of outreach in many rural financial 
systems. Because they are often strongly influenced by donor 
activities, I focus the discussion that follows on transaction 
costs. I first define these costs, then discuss their role in 
rationing financial services, briefly discuss how these costs 
might be reduced, provide a few comments on why they are an 
important issue in financial markets that are being reformed, and 
conclude by suggesting ways for donors to better deal with these 
costs. 
1Continued disagreement is illustrated by two World Bank 
publications in 1993. One publication issued by the Operations 
Evaluation Department argued that the Bank should continue 
funding traditional agricultural credit projects. Another 
publication prepared by the Operations Policy Department argued 
for a cessation of these programs. 
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TRANSACTION COSTS DEFINED 
Transaction costs are to the functioning of financial 
markets what friction is to a machine. A carefully crafted and 
well lubricated automobile engine, for example, will create less 
friction and thus operate more efficiently than engines without 
these qualities--it will go further on a tank of gasoline. 
Engines with excessive friction clatter along, generate heat, and 
eventually grind to a stop. Excessive transaction costs have a 
similar effect on the operations of a financial market--they 
shorten its life and lessen its outreach. 
Transaction costs are the implicit and explicit expenses 
incurred by participants in financial markets to effect financial 
transactions--excluding interest payments, the costs of funds, 
and loan losses. These costs fall into two broad categories: the 
opportunity cost of time spent by borrowers and depositors as 
they negotiate financial contracts and the explicit expenses 
incurred by all participants to form, to fulfill, and to enforce 
these obligations. Total transaction costs (t) can be subdivided 
into the costs incurred by the five major sets of participants in 
financial markets: borrowers (b), depositors (d), lenders (1), 
deposit mobilizers (dm), and regulators (r): 
t = b + d + 1 + dm + r. (1) 
Borrowers• costs include the value of time they spend 
soliciting, negotiating, withdrawing, and repaying their loans. 
It also includes costs for trips to deal with the lender, costs 
of providing suitable collateral, out-of-pocket costs for 
preparing loan documents, gratuities for co-signers, possible 
bribes or broker's fees to influence loan decisions, the 
opportunity costs involved in compensatory balances, and other 
expenses incurred in sustaining and enhancing their 
creditworthiness. A borrower's cost (be) of a loan--the 
perceived price of the loan--is the sum of these transaction 
costs (b) plus interest payments made for the loan (il): 
be = b + il. (2) 
Depositors' costs mostly involve the opportunity cost of 
time spent in searching for savings alternatives, in making 
deposits and withdrawals, along with any associated 
transportation expenses (Guerrero 1988). The net return that 
savers receive on their deposits (nrd) is equal to the interest 
received on deposits (id) less the transaction costs they incur 
(d) : 
nrd = id - d. (3) 
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Lenders' transaction costs mostly stem from gathering and 
processing information required to screen potential borrowers, 
process loans and associated collateral, costs of monitoring 
loans, and expenses generated by loan collection or collateral 
seizure. A significant part of these costs are engendered by the 
lender managing the risks involved in credit. The net returns 
from lending equals interest paid on the loan (il) less the 
lender's loan transaction costs (1), less the cost of funds lent 
(cf), less loan losses (11), less the lender's costs of 
submitting to prudential regulation {lr): 
nrl = il - 1 - cf - 11 - lr. (4) 
Deposit mobilization also imposes transaction costs on the 
mobilizer; deposit documents must be issued, transactions 
handled, records kept, and reserve requirements met. For a 
financial intermediary that relies only on deposits and equity 
capital for lending the cost of funds (cf) equals the interest 
paid on deposits (id), the dividend paid on equity (e), plus the 
transaction costs of sustaining this activity (dm), and the costs 
of submitting to any prudential regulation or insurance (dmr): 
cf = id + e+ dm + dmr. (5) 
Especially in financial institutions that mobilize deposits, 
there is often a public interest in guarding these funds from 
theft and malfeasance. This leads to the formation of deposit 
guarantees and prudential regulation, both of which typically 
impose additional transaction costs on financial institutions. 2 
Intermediaries may be forced to pay insurance premiums and to 
also incur additional costs of being examined and supervised. 
The expenses involved in setting up and running these insurance 
or regulatory agencies can be significant. Furthermore, to 
stabilize liquidity or to insert additional funds into a rural 
financial system, a second-story financial facility may be 
created to dispense or to receive funds. Examples of this are a 
specialized office in a central bank, a national federation for 
cooperatives, or a second-story bank for non-governmental 
organizations. The total regulatory costs (rc) are equal to the 
2Agricultural lenders may also be involved in loan insurance 
schemes. In some cases it is difficult to distinguish between 
loan guarantee programs and crop or enterprise insurance. A crop 
insurance program may be essentially loan insurance when lenders 
have first claim on damage payments. Typically, governments 
promote loan insurance and sometimes crop insurance to alter 
lender behavior in favor of the activity that is insured. This 
is beyond the prudential regulation interests that governments 
have in financial markets. 
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regulatory costs imposed on the lender (lr), the regulatory costs 
imposed on the deposit mobilizer (dmr), plus the costs of 
operating the regulatory organizations (ro): 
rc = lr + dmr + ro. (6) 
Where the purchasing power of money declines due to 
inflation, the nominal values represented in equations 2 through 
5 must be converted to real values. This involves subtracting a 
price change element (p) in each of these equations. Other 
things equal, inflation benefits debtors (borrowers and deposit 
mobilizers) to the determent of the creditors in the system 
(depositors and lenders). 
An additional distinction between transaction costs is worth 
making. These costs are normally high in non-urban areas because 
of the nature of rural financial intermediation; particularly 
among individuals with scant collateral, those with modest and 
irregular incomes, and those who do small transactions. Even 
under the best of circumstances transaction costs in rural 
finance are higher than in urban centers because of the distances 
involved. In addition to normal transaction costs, additional 
costs may be imposed on participants by other donor or government 
intrusions that I label loan targeting. 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND RATIONING 
Transaction costs in rural financial markets are not 
allocated in fixed proportions among participants (Cuevas and 
Graham 1986). New and non-preferred clients generally incur 
higher transaction costs for a given financial product than do 
previous or preferred clients. These costs per unit of 
transaction for both the financial intermediary and the client 
generally decline as their working relationship matures, as the 
size of the financial transaction increases, and as the financial 
system becomes more efficient (Saito and Villanueva 1981). 
Rationing 
Recent research is also showinq that the allocation of these 
costs among the four categories of participants, among 
individuals in each category, and the sum total of transaction 
costs are strongly influenced by financial market policies and by 
other government and donor actions (Cuevas and Graham 1984; 
Ladman 1984). In many cases reallocated transaction costs 
partially substitute for price in the rationing of financial 
services. In analyzing this it is useful to separate these costs 
into those that are "naturally" associated with financial 
intermediation and those that are imposed on participants by 
regulation or loan targeting. Several examples may clarify how 
this reallocation functions. 
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A number of governments have imposed interest rate ceilings 
on agricultural loans. These rates were often below commercial 
rates and sometimes below the expected rates of inflation. This 
generates an excess demand for loans and forces lenders to devise 
substitutes for interest rates to perform the rationing function. 
one common alternative is for the lender to shift part of their 
normal loan transaction cost to non-preferred clients, or to 
create additional hurdles that non-preferred clients must 
overcome to access subsidized funds. Forcing new borrowers and 
borrowers of small amounts to stand in line, to make numerous 
trips to the bank to transact a loan, forcing them to pay for a 
bank technician to visit their farms, and requiring them to pay 
for loan application forms are all signs of this reallocation. 
I vividly remember visiting a small branch of a bank in the 
Belize a number of years ago that was extending cheap credit and 
seeing long lines of poor farmers waiting in the hot sun in the 
front of the bank to negotiate their loans for the next cropping 
season. On average these farmers visited the bank 6 or 7 times 
to negotiate, withdraw, and repay loans. 3 This often involved 
sacrificing a half day or more of work to effect each 
transaction. While interviewing the harried branch manager I 
overheard him quickly negotiate loans on the phone with preferred 
clients who were only required to visit the bank twice: to sign 
and receive their loan and then later to repay. 
Also during the interview, several preferred clients entered 
the branch by the back door, were given cold drinks, and then 
quickly negotiated new loans with the manager. These individuals 
had been bank clients for a number of years and also borrowed 
sizable amounts. In relative and also in absolute terms the bank 
was imposing higher transaction costs on the farmers waiting in 
front of the bank than it imposed on preferred, "back door" 
clients. This resulted in the borrowing costs per unit of money 
borrowed for non-preferred borrowers being substantially higher 
than that incurred by preferred clients. Under these 
circumstances it was not surprising to find a relatively large 
portion of the operators of small farms in Belize using informal 
sources of credit that charged higher interest rates on loans 
than did the bank, but employing procedures that imposed few 
transaction costs on borrowers. 
Why did the bank do this? Rather than being a nefarious 
plot to exclude poor people from formal loans, it was the normal 
reaction of any firm that is trying to maximize its returns by 
limiting its costs. At least some of the transaction costs for 
the non-preferred borrowers would have been absorbed by the bank 
3see Ahmed 1980, Ahmed 1989, Ladman 1984, and also Nehman 
for similar cases in Sudan, in Bangladesh, in Bolivia, and in 
Brazil. 
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through hiring more loan officers, by expanding the size of the 
branch, and by simplifying its procedures for non-preferred 
clients if interest rates had been allowed to play a larger role 
in loan-rationing. 
Loan targeting 
Cuevas and Graham (1984) provide a Honduran example of how 
loan targeting affects overall transaction costs. Targeting 
occurs when donors or governments provide funds to lenders that 
must be lent for specified purposes: for example, for fertilizer 
purchase, for rice production, for purchase of machinery, for 
operators of small farms, for women, or for operators of 
microenterprises. To assure compliance with lending targets the 
providers of funds usually require detailed reports on borrowers 
and loans and then later require credit-impact studies. In some 
cases this might involve a bank maintaining separate records on 
dozens of targeted lending programs. 4 In Honduras the banks 
that managed these targeted programs incurred sharply higher loan 
transaction costs per unit of money lent than did banks that 
avoided these programs. Borrowers also incurred additional 
transaction costs in complying with provisions attached to the 
targeted funds. An extreme example of this occurred in Tunisia a 
number of years ago when farmers were forced to complete seven 
sets of loan application forms that were then sent to various 
donor and government offices in order to qualify for "cheap" 
targeted loans. 
Several years ago I stood in a large room in the Central 
Bank of Bolivia that was filed with paperwork generated by 
several dozen targeted lending programs. I later saw file 
cabinets full of duplicate reports on these programs in several 
donor and government offices in La Paz. Very little of this 
avalanche of paper was analyzed and none of it contributed 
materially to any significant decision--few of the reports were 
ever read by any decision maker. The transaction costs of 
assembling, processing, and reporting the data were a dead-weight 
loss on the financial system. Even worse, this useless targeting 
information crowded out data that would have been useful to 
managers of financial institutions, and likewise to donors, such 
as status of loan recovery, number of people served, 
documentation of lender transaction costs, and viability of 
financial institutions. 
4In the early 1980s the Central Bank of Indonesia maintained 
nearly 200 separate targeted lending programs. Most agricultural 
development banks in low-income countries were forced during the 
1970s and 1980s to manage at least several dozen of these 
targeted programs. 
7 
I have seen targeted fertilizer/credit programs in Ghana, 
The Philippines, and Bangladesh that also imposed additional 
transaction costs on borrowers. In each case, formula loans were 
given in-kind to borrowers. This involved farmers receiving a 
fixed number of sacks of fertilizer for each hectare of targeted 
crop. Because of expected low marginal returns from fertilizer 
use, however, many of the borrowers decided to use fewer sacks 
than they borrowed and to sell at a discount in the informal 
market the remainder, thus adding to their transaction costs of 
obtaining the type of loan they desired. 
Loan quotas, loan size ceilings, and loan guarantee funds 
are other ways that governments attempt to force lenders to 
allocate loans in politically determined ways. These programs 
likewise increase transaction costs. A number of years ago the 
Colombian government required commercial banks to allocate a 
minimum of 15 percent of the value of their loans to agricultural 
credit. Most banks evaded the intent of this regulation by 
sifting through their existing portfolios and relabeling loans. 
A loan for the purchase of a truck was relabeled to be an 
agricultural transportation loan, a loan to a manufacturer who 
also had a farm was relabeled to be a farm loan and so on. 
In this same vain about 15 years ago the government imposed 
a loan size ceiling on the agricultural development bank in the 
Dominican Republic with the aim of forcing it to make more loans 
to poor people. This resulted in the bank making multiple loans 
to preferred individuals that were each below the loan size 
ceiling, thereby substantially increasing loan transaction costs 
for both borrower and lender. About the same time the 
Philippines government established a loanjcrop insurance program 
to encourage banks to lend more to farmers. This resulted in the 
formation of a large agency to handle the loanjcrop insurance, an 
increase in the amount of paperwork associated with making a 
loan, and substantial additional transaction costs for everyone 
involved in loss claims. 
Deposits 
Although less dynamic than their loan cousins, transaction 
costs also play a role in deposits. Substantial reserve 
requirements may induce banks to limit the size of deposit 
accounts they will accept to relatively large amounts, such as 
was done in Kenya during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Changes 
in banking laws in Mexico during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
also caused banks to eliminate a large number of savings accounts 
by raising minimum deposit requirements. These reactions in 
Kenya and in Mexico reduced the transaction costs of banks 
handling deposits but also increased the transaction costs of 
depositors who were forced to use various techniques to marshall 
the requisite deposit amounts or to seek alternative forms of 
saving. 
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The reverse of this happened in Bangladesh and in India 
during the 1970s when the governments induced banks to open rural 
branches by tying the provision of an urban branch license to a 
bank opening several rural branches. This increased the 
transaction costs of the bank but also reduced the transaction 
costs of clients in rural areas, particularly depositors. 
Several countries including The Philippines and Pakistan have 
experimented with using mobile banks in rural areas which had the 
same effect on the distribution of transaction costs. 
Relative importance 
It is noteworthy that the relative importance of transaction 
costs in influencing behavior among participants varies 
substantially. Because the normal costs for a lender to 
negotiate a loan is relatively fixed, they prefer to deal mostly 
with large loans that involve a small ratio of lender-
transaction-costs to total-value-of-loan. These considerations 
tilt intermediaries in favor of handling relatively large 
transactions, both loans and deposits. For both borrowers and 
depositors the importance of transaction costs varies inversely 
with the size of the loan or deposit. The transaction cost 
component of borrower's costs and of the net benefits for 
depositors usually decrease as the size of the transaction 
increases. Borrowers and depositors of small amounts will, 
therefore, be quite sensitive to changes in transaction costs, 
while borrowers and depositors of larger amounts will be more 
strongly influenced by changes in interest rates. 
The behavior of the lender and deposit mobilizer is strongly 
influenced by both interest rates and transaction costs (Untalan 
and Cuevas 1989). Under the best of circumstances a financial 
intermediary has weak incentives to provide financial services to 
new rural clients who are poor because of the naturally high 
transaction costs the intermediary incurs in dealing with these 
clients. Enforcing low interest rates on credit transactions 
along with extensive loan targeting that increases the lender's 
costs exacerbates this problem. The low interest rates generate 
an excess demand that typically causes the lender to off-load 
additional transaction costs on non-preferred borrowers. Under 
these circumstances borrowers who are relatively well-to-do 
receive the bulk of the cheap loans while the effective borrowing 
costs for poor people may be increased because of the imposition 
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of sharply higher transaction costs on them. 5 "Cheap credit" 
ends up not being cheap for poor people under these circumstances 
because of the reallocation of transaction costs. 
REDUCING TOTAL TRANSACTION COSTS 
Other things being equal, total transaction costs per unit 
of funds handled decrease as the size of the transaction 
increases, as the distance from urban areas decreases, and as the 
amount of regulation or targeting decreases. Transaction costs 
are a major reason why it is so difficult to provide small loans 
that are targeted to clients in rural areas. It is also a major 
explanation for the tendency of formal financial systems to 
concentrate their activities in urban areas, among firms and 
individuals that are relatively well-to-do, and to avoid serving 
non-target groups. This tendency can only be changed if 
significant reductions are made in total transaction costs, 
especially those costs incurred by the financial intermediary. 
This reduction will allow the financial engine to run more 
smoothly and facilitate the outreach of the system to embrace 
additional clients. 
Transaction costs can be reduced through four means. One 
important way is through scale economies when the staff and 
facilities of the intermediary are used more efficiently by 
handling a larger volume of business. Overall economic growth 
allowed this to occur in countries such as Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea. People who have more economic opportunities 
and higher incomes tend to rely more on formal finance than they 
did earlier. 
Another way of reducing transaction costs is through scope 
economies where an intermediary is able to use staff and 
facilities more efficiently by providing multiple financia1 
services. An agricultural development bank in the Dominican 
Republic realized scope economies during the 1980s and ear1y 
1990s by expanding its services from just providing loans to 
about 30 thousand borrowers, to also managing about 150 thousand 
deposit accounts without increasing the size of its staff. 
5Poor depositors are also adversely affected by cheap 
credit. Low interest rates on loans force even lower rates on 
deposits; poor people have less latitude than well-to-do people 
to avoid these low rates. The provision of cheap targeted funds 
from outside reinforces the decisions of intermediaries to 
discourage depositors of small amounts by raising associated 
transaction costs. This, in turn, blocks one of the natural 
avenues that poor people use to enhance their creditworthiness by 
demonstrating their savings abilities to lenders. 
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Because financial contracts depend heavily on information, 
the associated transaction costs are sensitive to tecbnologies 
that alter the efficiency of collecting and processing this 
information. Computers play a key role in reducing these costs. 
It would have been impossible for the agricultural bank in the 
Dominican Republic to handle 150 thousand additional accounts 
with the same number of staff, for example, without employing 
modern data processing (Gonzalez-Vega 1992). Computers also 
allowed the installation of automatic teller machines in Japan 
that enabled all members of farmers• associations to withdraw or 
deposit funds 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-weeks, at thousands of 
locations throughout the country with obvious implications for 
the transaction costs of clients and the associations. 
Dealing with groups is still another technique for reducing 
transaction cost, both in lending and deposit mobilization. 6 
Ideally, transaction costs for both lender and borrower are less 
if the intermediary makes one relatively large loan to a group of 
individuals rather a number of smaller loans to individuals 
(Huppi and Feder 1990)). If a loan is negotiated by only a few 
representatives of the group the average borrower under a group 
loan incurs less borrower transaction costs than they would if 
they negotiated an individual loan. Likewise, programs that 
mobilize deposits from groups may also lessen transaction costs 
of both mobilizer and depositor. A pygmy deposit mobilization 
program in India, for example, used commission agents who 
collected small deposits daily from a group of savers that were 
then deposited in a commercial bank (Bhatt 1988). This 
arrangement clearly reduced the depositor's transaction costs and 
may also have eliminated some of the costs of the bank dealing 
directly with a large number of depositors. Several NGO's in the 
Philippines have also experimented with using informal groups to 
mobilize deposits for banks. 7 
Financial innovations 
In recent years many of the innovations in grain production 
were developed in specialized research centers in Mexico and in 
the Philippines; parallel breakthroughs in fertilizer emanated 
from a specialized research center in the United States. New 
financial technology has no similar focal point; new financial 
ideas can sprout virtually anywhere. Financial innovations are 
also somewhat unique in that they are not always cost reducing 
6several well known examples of group lending are the 
Grameen Bank's model in Bangladesh (Getubig and others 1993), the 
Lilongwe Project in Malawi (Schaefer-Kehnert 1982), and the Bank 
for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand (Yaron 
1992b). 
7Personal communication with Virginia Abiad. 
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(Kane 1984). Formal financial intermediaries are especially 
creative in designing ways to mitigate the impact of policy 
restrictions when doing so is in their own best interest. These 
innovation, however, may increase the total costs of financial 
intermediation. The example cited earlier of a bank that evaded 
the intent of loan size limits by issuing multiple loans to the 
same firm or individuals is an example of this. Unfortunately, 
in financial systems that are heavily regulated and in which 
extensive loan targeting occurs, a good deal of the innovative 
energy in formal finance is spent in mining the loopholes in 
rules and regulations, rather than in searching for new ways of 
doing things that reduce overall transaction costs. 
Despite its undeserved, unsavory reputation informal finance 
is a major hatchery for cost-reducing financial technologies. In 
large part informal finance succeeds in providing sustained 
financial services to large numbers of poor people in rural areas 
because of the cost reducing innovations that are spawned by 
competition among informal agents. Much of the success of the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and ACCION International in Latin 
America in reaching large numbers of poor people is explained by 
their creative adaptation of techniques commonly used in informal 
finance (Getubig and others 1993, Christen 1992). Groups, a 
hallmark of the Grameen Bank approach, is a common feature in 
informal finance in the form of informal self-help financial 
groups that are found not only in Bangladesh but also in most 
other low-income countries. Another distinctive feature of the 
Grameen Bank as well as a highly successful village banking 
program in Indonesia is requiring loan repayments each week 
{Patten and Rosengard). Again, this is a common feature in many 
types of informal lending. 
Informal finance is also more attuned to creating and 
providing the types of financial services that poor people prefer 
than is formal finance. In most cases centrally planned 
financial systems are not designed to provide the types of 
financial services that poor people desire. Recent research in a 
large agricultural bank in Egypt, for example, showed that most 
of the bank's employees were members of self-help financial 
groups in which they placed the majority of their deposits 
(Baydas and other 1993). In addition, many of the employees also 
bought consumer durables on time from other employees who were 
moonlighting as part-time merchants. Clearly, the bank was not 
producing the types of financial services that its own employees 
found to be most desirable and this forced them into informal 
arrangements. 
Informal finance is also more nimble in devising techniques 
that adjust to changing economic conditions than is the formal 
financial system. In the mid-1980s when Bolivia was suffering 
hyper inflation most informal self-help financial groups 
denominated their obligations to the group in dollars instead of 
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pesos to protect the contractual obligations from capital 
erosion. In contrast the Bolivian agricultural development bank 
persisted in charging negative real rates of interest on their 
loans and saw the purchasing power of its portfolio essentially 
evaporate by the late 1980s. Most of the credit unions in the 
country along with a number of previously successful savings and 
loan associations were also gutted by inflation and inflexible 
policies. It is paradoxical that self-help financial groups 
comprised of employees of these semi-formal financial 
institutions were among the first to adjust practices similarly 
to protect their informal savings. At the same time, these 
employees were unable (or unwilling) to protect their 
institutions from the onslaughts of inflation through the 
application of similar techniques. 
Expanding the formal financial frontier 
Von Pischke used the metaphor of a formal financial frontier 
in his analysis of development finance (1991). People inside the 
frontier have access to formal financial services while 
individuals and firms outside this frontier are forced to do 
without or to rely on self finance or informal finance. He goes 
on to argue that expanding this frontier is the primary challenge 
in developmental finance. One of the major factors that limits 
the expansion of this frontier is the friction caused by 
transaction costs. Formal financial institutions refuse to 
provide financial services to poor people in general, and to 
rural people in particular, because the costs of doing so under 
existing circumstances are excessive. 
A complementary way of thinking about this problem is to 
apply the metaphor of lubricants and viscosity. One of the major 
functions of financial instruments is to lubricate transactions 
thereby reducing the costs of effecting exchanges. Ideally, a 
financial system should be highly viscous, its financial services 
should cover a major part of the economy, including rural areas. 
If a financial system is severely repressed it resembles heavy-
weight oil that only covers a small portion of the economy and 
provides little lubrication. 8 A healthy and vibrant financial 
system, on the other hand, resembles light-weight oil that 
spreads and seeps into cracks and crevices in the economy and 
~cKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973} introduced the useful 
notion of financial repression. I am less comfortable with their 
application of the notion of market fragmentation to financial 
markets. They define a market to be fragmented if interest rates 
across the market vary. Their analysis ignores borrower 
transaction costs as part of the loan rationing mechanism and 
also ignores that the financial system may be producing a variety 
of products, many of which are called loans, but which might be 
more correctly thought of as distinct products and services. 
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provides extensive lubrication for transactions. Although not 
the only explanation, transaction costs are a major determinant 
of financial viscosity and are a major explanation for the 
excessive amount of friction that exists in formal financial 
markets in rural areas. A financial system that loads excessive 
transaction costs on participants will reach relatively few 
people compared to a financial system that reduces these costs. 
TRANSACTION COSTS IN CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES 
In extreme cases, centrally planned economies operate 
essentially without financial intermediation. In the former 
soviet Union, for example, deposit mobilization and loan 
allocation were bifurcated and the financial system was often 
used as a fiscal tool. Deposits were mobilized by one arm of the 
system and they then flowed into a governmental labyrinth. At 
the same time, targeted funds for lending were dispensed by the 
government through bank channels in accord with central plans. 
This included lending to enterprises to sustain production and 
forgiving loans to enterprises that encountered economic 
hardship. The fiscal nature of the system was accentuated by 
inflation during the late 1980s and early 1990s; most of the 
purchasing power of deposit was effectively captured by 
government through an inflation tax while borrowers received 
hefty subsidies through negative real rates of interest on loans 
and loan write-offs. 
Transaction costs are largely ignored in these pseudo-
financial systems. State-controlled enterprises receive large 
loans that are automatically approved, lenders are little 
concerned with creditworthiness, and government may build a dense 
network of savings deposit branches to provide employment 
opportunities. The switch to a market economy quickly magnifies 
the importance of transaction costs. Employees of the financial 
system must quickly learn how to assess creditworthiness of a 
large number of new production and marketing units that typically 
request relatively small loans. Many of these firms may have no 
track record with the lender and be unable to provide suitable 
loan collateral. Building these new working relationships 
between clients and financial institutions will involve 
substantial transaction costs for both lenders and borrowers. 
Attempts to reform existing financial institutions to perform 
these new functions can founder on excessive transaction costs in 
the form of bloated bank employment, inefficient work habits, and 
antiquated data processing procedures. 9 
9several years ago I visited a sizeable bank branch in a 
rural area of Russia. When I asked the manager to see her 
record-keeping system she pulled a small spiral-bound notebook 
from her purse. one page listed a handful of deposits made by 
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Excessive transaction costs will severely limit for a number 
of years the outreach of any new financial institutions that are 
expected to provide rural financial services in these reforming 
countries. This may force these institutions to focus there 
lending initially on the new firms that operate in product and 
input markets. Because of transaction costs it will be easier 
for the struggling financial system to deal with these types of 
clients, who, in turn, may extend informal loans to at least some 
of their clients. 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND DONORS 
In part, transaction costs in a financial system are a 
function of overall development. Modern communication 
facilities, efficient transportation networks, expeditious 
judicial systems, and a thriving economy are vital ingredients in 
lowering these costs. Beyond this, nevertheless, donors and 
governments have several options for further limiting these costs 
(Meyer and Cuevas 1990). 
Avoid loan targeting 
Government and donor funding can have a major impact on 
transaction costs in financial markets. Inevitably targeted 
loans impose substantial additional transaction costs on both 
lender and borrower. The political forces that generate the 
targeting in the first place bring with it the requirement for 
social accountability--showing that the objectives of targeting 
are met. Supplying the information that describes who received 
credit, what uses were supposedly made of loans, and attempting 
to measure the social and economic impact of targeted lending 
generates ample additional transaction costs for both borrower 
and lender. In addition, if the targeted lending is also done on 
concessionary terms, intermediaries are induced to shift or 
impose transaction costs on non-preferred borrowers and 
depositors as ways of rationing their services. Forcing them to 
do otherwise results in regulation avoidance, subsidy dependence, 
and debilitation of financial institutions. 
Instead of targeting lending, donor and government programs 
should be aimed at enhancing the efficiency of financial 
intermediation and reducing overall transaction costs, thereby 
increasing the outreach of the system. In large part, the new 
World Bank guidelines provided by the Handbook on Financial 
Sector Operations (1993) promote this change. 1° Financial 
her employees in the bank for safekeeping and another dozen pages 
listed loans extended, repaid, and written-off. 
10The World Bank's World Development Report 1989 supported a 
similar change in approach. 
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contracts are ill suited instruments to either address poverty 
directly, or to prod development. Any subsidy attached to a loan 
contract is inevitably proportional to the size of the loan and 
thereby distributes subsidies regressively. Although subsidies 
on loans may induce individuals to borrow, there is no close 
relationship between the credit subsidy and the incentives 
borrowers have to produce or invest because of the fungibility of 
funds. 
Regulation 
Donors and governments must also walk a fine line regarding 
supervision and regulation of financial markets. Prudential 
regulation is a moral imperative when a financial system 
mobilizes private deposits. A similar prudential justification 
exists when the financial system is lending funds provided by 
governments or donors. A society, be it domestic or foreign, 
should not be asked to fund a credit project that is not 
prudentially safeguarded. Trying to force the financial system 
to do something that is not in its best interest through 
excessive regulation and supervision, however, generally achieves 
little more than increasing transaction costs. Loan quotas, 
interest rate restrictions, loan insurance, and reserve 
requirements are all common policies that influence transaction 
costs and the distribution of these costs among financial market 
participants. 
Donors should support and promote prudential regulation. 
Attempting to alter the normal behavior of financial markets 
through other regulations, however, should be avoided because of 
its undesirable effects on transaction costs. 
Encouraging innovations 
Governments and donors should avoid distracting the managers 
of financial systems from seeking cost-reducing innovations. 
This includes avoiding conditions that promote rent seeking in 
financial markets and avoiding the imposition of rules that 
promote regulation avoidance. Extensive loan targeting and 
associated subsidies can turn financial intermediation into a 
feeding frenzy for rent seekers. 11 Many targeted borrowers-may 
decide unilaterally to expand the size of subsidy they receive by 
11Extremes in real interest rates, either high or low, 
attract rent seekers: high rates attract the moral hazard people 
who are seeking the delinquency subsidy (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981), while low rates are surrounded by people seeking the 
interest rate subsidy (Gonzalez-Vega 1977). 
1.6 
failing to repay their loans. 12 Seeing this, loan officers feel 
justified in sharing part of the largess by soliciting bribes for 
favorable lending decisions. The creative energy spent in 
colonizing and exploiting these subsidies comes at the expense of 
creative energy that might have been channelled toward designing 
innovations that make the financial system more efficient and 
thereby extend its outreach. 
A similar diversion of creative energy occurs when financial 
markets are overly regulated by attempts to distort their 
activities in ways that are politically desirable: for example, 
loans for operators of small businesses, for women, for rice 
farmers, or for a minority group. These types of regulations 
typically force creative managers to mine loopholes in the 
regulations in ways that are beneficial to managers of the 
institution, but that also result in more friction in the form of 
transaction costs being inserted into financial intermediation. 
In addition to avoiding the misdirection of creative energy, 
donors and governments should promote incentives that stimulate 
employees in financial institutions to seek cost-reducing 
innovations that benefit both clients and intermediaries. 
Fostering a competitive environment should be a vital part of 
this, including competition among formal financial intermediaries 
and competition with informal finance. In many low-income 
countries the formal financial system does not effectively 
compete with informal finance. It may only be able to enhance 
this competition by adapting some of the innovations used by 
informal finance to minimize transaction costs. 
Yaron (1992a) has suggested that future World Bank projects 
with major credit components should include a measure of subsidy 
dependency. He implies that the degree of dependency is a proxy 
for the durability of the activity. A parallel measure of the 
extent to which a donor's credit project increases or decreases 
transaction costs, and a measure that also documents who is 
likely to bear these costs might likewise be a useful 
supplementary indicator of the durability of a financial program. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is no blueprint for building durable rural financial 
systems; they are difficult to form, often perform below 
expectations, and can be easily debilitated. Financial friction 
in the form of transaction costs are a major explanation for 
12If the loan is justified on the basis of a person being 
poor and needing assistance it is easy for lenders and for policy 
maker to rationalize expanding the subsidy through tolerating 
loan delinquency. 
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this. The extent to which these costs are moderated will 
importantly influence the performance of rural financial markets 
in both low-income countries and in countries that are 
experiencing massive economic reforms. Governments and donors 
that wish to provide sustained formal financial services to new 
clients, to poor people, and to rural people in general will be 
unable to do so unless transaction costs are reduced, thereby 
enhancing the outreach of financial systems. Less loan 
targeting, more reliance on interest rates to ration financial 
services, and more emphasis on stimulating cost-reducing 
innovations must be major parts of this. 
18 
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